The True Purpose of Motions in Limine - Poor Substitute for Summary Judgment
posted on October 17th, 2008 in Summary Judgment, In Limines by clintMotions in limine are not to be used as a sweeping means of testing issues of law. Such motions are to be used to prevent some specific matter, perhaps inflammatory, from being interjected prior to the trial court’s having decided on its admissibility outside the hearing of the jury. Kozy Kitchen v. State, 607 S.W.2d 345 (1980); Arkansas State Highway Comm. v. Pulaski Inv. Co., 272 Ark. 389, 614 S.W.2d 675 (1981). In Kozy Kitchen v. State, the appellate court refused to reverse the denial of a vague motion in limine which, like this one, was filed without legal authority on the morning of trial. The appellate court cited Bridges v. City of Richardson, 349 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.Civ.App.1961) where it was said that motions in limine are to enlighten the court and advise counsel of the specific nature of the anticipated testimony so that the court may intelligently act on such motions. The motion in limine is a useful tool, but care must be exercised to avoid indiscriminate application of it lest parties be prevented from even trying to prove their contentions.
That a plaintiff may have a thin case or a defendant a tenuous defense is ordinarily insufficient justification for prohibiting such party from trying to establish the contention. Nor should a party ordinarily be required to try a case or defense twice-once outside the jury’s presence to satisfy the trial court of its sufficiency and then again before the jury. Moreover, the motion in limine is not ordinarily employed to choke off an entire claim or defense, as it was here regarding arson. Rather, it is usually used to prohibit mention of some specific matter, such as an inflammatory piece of evidence, until the admissibility of that matter has been shown out of the hearing of the jury. Turner v. Northwest Arkansas Neurosurgery Clinic, P.A., 133 S.W.3d 417 (Ark.App.2003).
Motions in limine serve fundamentally different purposes than motions for summary judgment. They are not subject to the same procedural safeguards. Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069-70 (3d Cir.1990). Thus, a motion in limine should not be used as a substitute for a dispositive motion such as a motion for summary judgment. See e.g., Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5037.18 (2d ed.2005); Craig Lee Montz, Trial Objections From Beginning to End: The Handbook for Civil and Criminal Trials, 29 Pepp. L.Rev. 243, 256 (2002) (stating that a motion in limine “may not be used as a substitute for a motion for summary judgment.” Even though a motion in limine may be used to narrow evidentiary issues in advance of trial, it should not be mistaken for a method to dismiss an opponent’s claim.”).
Courts that have addressed attempts to use a motion in limine in such a manner, either explicitly or implicitly, have found such use to be in error. Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d at 1069-70; Cannon v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 341 Ill.App.3d 674, 276 Ill.Dec. 593, 794 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Ill.App.Ct.2003); Lin v. Gatehouse Constr. Co., 84 Ohio App.3d 96, 616 N.E.2d 519, 524-25 (Ohio Ct.App.1992); BHG, Inc. v. F.A.F., Inc., 784 A.2d 884, 886 (R.I.2001). As several courts have noted, a motion in limine should not be used to “choke off” a party’s entire claim or defense. McCracken v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 445 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Iowa Ct.App.1989); Cass Bank & Trust Co. v. Mestman, 888 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Mo.Ct.App.1994).
Keep these rules in mind as you stave off the defendant’s in limines, which are often improperly used as poor substitutes for a summary judgment motion.