Kelly on Malpractice

What happens in a medical malpractice case if you have multiple defendants in different venues who combined to cause one indivisible injury? The Samuelson doctrine comes into play. The Samuelson doctrine springs forth from comparative fault principles. In Samuelson v. McMurtry, 962 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn.1998), the Supreme Court faced a medical malpractice action where two physicians and a chiropractor combined to cause a death. The decedent had seen the physicians in a hospital emergency room two days before his death. He had seen the chiropractor one day before his death. The estate alleged that the physician negligently failed to diagnose the decedent’s condition and that chiropractor negligently failed to refer him to a physician. Expert medical evidence showed that the decedent’s chest and back pain were caused by pneumonia. The deceased’s condition could have been treated successfully within 6 to 12 hours prior to his death. The complaint charged that the physicians failed to diagnose properly the decedent’s condition; that HCA wrongfully refused him treatment; and that the chiropractor failed to refer the deceased to a physician for treatment. The trial court granted severed the claim against the chiropractor from the claim against the physicians. The patient appealed. The Supreme Court determined that the negligent acts of the chiropractor were separate and independent acts combined with separate and independent acts of the physicians to cause a single, indivisible injury - death. Thus, because defendants would not be jointly liable for patient’s death, the claim against chiropractor was improperly severed. The Court held that severance deprived the estate of the right to proceed against chiropractor in same trial with other defendants and also of right to have the decedent’s fault compared with fault of all defendants. The Court also held that the physicians were deprived of an opportunity to have fault apportioned against chiropractor. Looking at Rule 19 and comparative fault principles, the Court found that complete relief in actions involving comparative fault cannot be accorded to all parties unless persons potentially bearing some fault in the tort committed against the plaintiff are joined as parties. Consequently, under comparative fault principles, where the separate, independent negligent acts of more than one tortfeasor combine to cause a single, indivisible injury, all tortfeasors must be joined in the same action, unless joinder is prohibited by law. See also Hutchings v. Methodist Hosp. of McKenzie, 2000 WL 33774484 (Tenn.Ct.App.) (applying the Samuelson doctrine to join claims in two cases in two counties against multiple defendants in one court to accord relief to all parties in one action). The lesson of the Samuelson doctrine is that multiple tortfeasors in different venues who separately combine to cause an indivisible injury must be joined in one action. Comparative fault principles and Rule 19 necessitate this result because joint and several liability no longer exists in Tennessee. The Samuelson doctrine also achieves judicial economy by resolving all claims in one forum. This also prevents the unfairness associated with splintered claims and empty chairs. Therefore, in accordance with Samuelson, a trial court must must multiple tortfeasors in medical malpractice case to accord relief to all the parties in one action.

You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.